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This paper presents a model where income distribution and redistributive fiscal policy in-
teract to affect the budget deficit and the pattern of net borrowing of a country. According
to the standard representative agent paradigm, a small open economy should smooth con-
sumption by borrowing from (lending to) the rest of the world when its income increases
(declines) over time. The simple model of this paper delivers exactly the same predictions
in the absence of income dispersion. When income distribution is not degenerate, however,
the same model gives rise to a surprising wealth of results. In particular, poor economies
with high inequality may exhibit completely counterintuitive patterns of fiscal policy and
external borrowing. The country's production path declines over time, because the more
mobile agents leave the country to escape taxation; yet, the country might end up having
a budget deficit and borrowing from abroad, thereby reinforcing rather than smoothing
the asymmetry in consumption between the two periods. An important feature of this
outcome is that it is backed by both the poor and the rich, who gain from the fiscal system
at the expense of the middle class.
I thank Ian Jewitt and two anonymous referees for many comments that led to a sub-
stantial revision of the paper. I also thank Francesco Caselli, Philip Lane, and Federico
Sturzenegger for comments on earlier versions.
1 Introduction.
The standard representative agent, neoclassical model implies that a country should
smooth consumption by borrowing from (lending to) the rest of the world when its
production increases (declines) over time (see e.g. Sachs (1982) and Svensson and Razin
(1983)). While the neoclassical model seems to fit well the behavior of industrialized
countries (see for instance Ahmed (1986)), it has difficulty explaining certain patterns
of behavior in the recent history of developing countries. An importat example is the
failure of several Latin American and African countries during the '80's to adjust their
fiscal policies, and the resulting current account imbalances, in response to what was
widely perceived as permanent negative shocks.
The neoclassical model is inherently unable to account for these phenomena be-
cause a representative, forward-looking agent would always internalize all the costs of
not smoothing consumption. Seemingly irrational patterns of borrowing and lending,
however, can be rationalized as the outcome of an interaction between different groups
over the distribution and redistribution of resources. Indeed, many observers have doc-
umented the role of an unequal distribution of income or political power in hampering
the adjustment to external shocks in many developing countries (see, among others,
Berg and Sachs (1988) and Tornell and Lane (1994)). At a more theoretical level, sev-
eral recent contributions (including Alesina and Drazen (1991), Laban and Sturzenegger
(1992) and Velasco (1992)) have modeled delays in stabilization as the outcome of power
struggles between two groups with different interests and characteristics. The common
elements to all these models is that some policies that are inefficient in an aggregate
sense are kept in place because the two parties cannot reach an agreement on how to
replace them.
The present paper too shows that the interaction of a non-degenerate income dis-
tribution and a redistributive fiscal policy in a small open economy can lead to a very
different dynamic behavior from that of a representative agent economy. Unlike the
papers cited above, the basic structure of the model comprises three, rather than two,
groups, who interact through a repeated voting process. This basic framework can
give rise to a surprising wealth of possibilities, depending on the average income of the
economy and the degree of inequality of its distribution of income.
The model has two periods, one factor supplied inelastically, one good produced
with a linear production function, a given world interest rate, and a fiscal system that
redistributes tax revenues from rich to poor individuals. The only complication to this
minimal set of assumptions is that any agent can escape taxation in the second period
by paying a fixed cost. In other words, in the long run the tax base is elastic to taxation.
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Initially, only the government can borrow or lend: the government budget surplus is
thus equal to the current account surplus. I then show that income dispersion does not
matter in rich economies: at any degree of inequality, they mimick exactly the behavior
of a representative agent economy. Poor economies are much more sensitive to the
pattern of income distribution, and may exhibit completely counterintuitive patterns of
fiscal policy and external borrowing. At high levels of inequality, the richer agents will
leave the country to escape taxation. Hence, the country has a declining income over
time, and yet it might end up running a budget deficit and borrowing from abroad,
thereby reinforcing rather than smoothing the asymmetry in consumption between the
two periods. An important feature of this outcome is that it is backed by both the poor
and the rich, who use the fiscal system at the expense of the middle class.
Thus, the model fits the stylized facts described above in that rich economies always
follow the neoclassical paradigm, regardless of how income is distributed, while poorer
economies with high income dispersion can exhibit completely different, and sometimes
very extreme, behaviors. In particular, the phenomenon of delays in stabilization can
arise as a special case in conditions of high inequality. Furthermore, this outcome has
many features in common with the stylized facts of "populist experiences": high budget
deficits caused by high redistributive expenditures and supported (for different reasons)
by both the poor and the rich, followed by sudden and anticipated reversals characterized
by the collapse of government expenditure and the need to repay the external debt (see
e.g. Dornbusch and Edwards (1990)).
Of course, letting private agents lend and borrow privately implies that each agent
can undo the effects of official borrowing and smooth consumption perfectly. Precisely
for this reason, the behavior of fiscal policy in poor, unequal countries becomes even more
extreme, with different majorities initially backing the highest possible budget deficit
and external borrowing, and as inequality increases further, the highest possible budget
surplus and external lending. Furthermore, the case of private borrowing and lending
has the interesting implication that poor, unequal economies exhibit two-way flows of
resources with the rest of the world, with private flows going in opposite direction to
official flows. This occurs even though private agents and the government face exactly
the same world interest rate.
It is important to emphasize that the dynamics of the model are driven by the inter-
play of income distribution and the redistributive fiscal system. In fact, when private
agents cannot borrow or lend the current account is entirely a reflection of the govern-
ment budget. Thus, the model can also be interpreted as a study of the relationship
between income distribution and budget deficits when fiscal policy is primarily redis-
tributive, as it is indeed the case in most industrialized and developing countries.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the model. In order
to isolate the role of income distribution, section 3 studies the case of the representative
agent version of the economy. Section 4 discusses some general features of the case of
income dispersion and introduces some restrictions on the parametrization of the model
in order to allow a clearer exposition of this case. Section 5 derives the equilibrium in
a poor economy, while section 6 does the same for the case of a rich economy. Section
7 analyse the effects of shocks to productivity and income distribution, and of opening
up private credit markets, respectively. Section 9 discusses the main assumptions and
possible extensions of the model, and its relationship with some related literature. In
sections 3 to 8, the emphasis is on the main intuition, rather than on algebra. Complete
formal proofs of all the propositions of the model can be found in the appendices.
2 The model.
1. Technology and factor endowments. A single factor, labor, can produce a single
non-storable good using a constant returns to scale production function: y = 9n, where
n is the input of labor and 9 - a strictly positive, deterministic parameter - represents
a technological shift factor. The good can be traded freely, and its world price is nor-
malized to 1. Each individual supplies his endowment of labor inelastically. Thus, the
income of an agent with labor endowment n is On. The economy is inhabited by a total
mass 1 of individuals. The total - and average - endowment of labor of the economy is
normalized to 1. As a consequence, the total and average income of the economy is 9.
The economy lasts for two periods. Any individual can move abroad at the begin-
ning of the second period. To use the foreign technology and earn income abroad, the
individual must pay the fixed cost d in the second period. Hence, d can be interpreted as
the loss of income that an individual must suffer in order to use the foreign technology.
The production function abroad is y — n. Thus, a value of 9 greater than 1 means that
the home country is richer than the rest of the world, and conversely if 9 is less than 1.
Income abroad is not taxed. In summary, an agent with labor endowment n who moves
abroad earns n — d, as opposed to the pre-tax income 9n he would be earning at home.
2. The distribution of endowments. The total endowment of labor in the home coun-
try is distributed among three types of agents, A, B and C, with per capita endowments
nAi nB a n d Tic respectively, where n^ < njg < nc- The mass of type i agents is pi,
where obviously p& + PB + pc = 1 • In addition, I assume that:
(i) pi < .5;
(") PA < PB
According to condition (i), a group cannot impose its proposal without the support of
at least another group. Hence, this assumption rules out trivial equilibria of the voting
process. Condition (ii) implies that, when agents C are not present in the economy, a
policy cannot be adopted if it does not have the support of the middle class, group B.
3. Preferences. Individuals value consumption according to the utility function:
where the first subscript refers to the time period and the second to the individual's
type. The elasticity of intertemporal substitution is constant and equal to the inverse of
<f>: individuals with a lower (f> are more willing to substitute consumption between the
two periods. In the limit, as <f> tends to 0, the utility function becomes close to linear
and the individual is almost indifferent to when he consumes his lifetime income. Most
of the results of the paper require an elasticity of intertemporal substitution greater
than 1, i.e. <j> < 1. If this were not the case, the utility of an agent that consumes
0 in a given period would be minus infinity in that period. Consequently, that agent
would be indifferent to any pattern of consumption that involves zero consumption in
at least one period. To avoid these situations, I assume that <f) < I .1 Since nothing sub-
stantial depends on the discount factor /?, from now on I will assume that it is equal to 1.
4. Fiscal policy. Fiscal policy consists of the simplest possible redistributive system: a
proportional tax on income whose proceeds are redistributed lump-sum to all individuals
in the economy. Thus, if TJ is the tax rate in period j and all agents are present in the
economy, the economy's total income, 0, is the tax base and TjO represents total tax
revenues. Since tax revenues are redistributed lump-sum, rfi is also the per capita
subsidy.
Initially I assume that private agents cannot borrow or lend. They can however shift
consumption between periods through the government, which can borrow from and lend
to the rest of the world at the given world interest rate. For simplicity, the world
interest rate is equal to the rate of time preference, 0. Hence, borrowing or lending is
not motivated by differences between the marginal rate of transformation for the country
as a whole and the marginal rate of substitution when consumption is the same in the
two periods.
, however, that empirical estimates of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution tend to reject
a value above unity.
As long as private agents cannot lend or borrow, the government budget balance is
equal to the current account balance. I denote the budget and current account deficits
in period 1 by X. A positive value of X indicates that in period 1 the country is running
budget and current account deficits and borrows X from abroad, while a negative value
of X indicates that in the same period the country lends the amount —X to the rest of
the world by running budget and current account surpluses. Any amount the government
borrows in period 1 is added to the tax revenues, T\6, and distributed lump-sum among
all individuals. Conversely, any amount the government lends in period 1 is subtracted
from the tax revenues that can be redistributed. Hence, the consumption of an individual
of type i in period 1 is:
Cu = (I - TjOm + Tl6 + X (2)
In period 2 the government, and the country through it, must repay the amount it
borrowed in period 1 if it was a net borrower or, in case it was a net lender in period
1, it receives the amount it lent to the rest of the world. If all agents are present in the
economy, so that the income of the economy is 6, the consumption of an agent of type
i in period 2 is therefore
C2i = (1 - T2)6ni + T2B-X (3)
Expressions (2) and (3) make clear that the tax rate that maximizes the consumption
of an individual of type i depends only on the value of n, as compared to 1: if the
individual has above-average endowment, his optimal tax rate is 0; if he has below-
average endowment, his optimal tax rate is I2.
Note also that, as in many models that analyse the internal politics of debt repay-
ment, such as Alesina and Drazen (1991), Alesina and Tabellini (1990) and Velasco
(1992), by assumption the government cannot default on the debt. However, by moving
abroad in period 2, an individual can avoid contributing to the repayment of the debt
incurred by the government in period 1.
5. The political system. In the first period, all agents vote on the tax rate T\ and on
the budget and current account deficit, X. Because in the second period the amount
received from or transferred to the rest of the world is just the opposite than in the
first period, in the second period only the tax rate r2 remains to be decided by majority
voting.
A "policy" in period 1 is a vector whose elements are a value of T\ and a value of X.
2Obviously, an individual with exactly the average endowment of labor is indifferent between any
tax rate. As a convention, I will assume that in this case he prefers a tax rate of 0. This can be justified,
for instance, if there are infinitesimal fixed costs in setting up a tax system.
In period 2, a policy is just a value of r2. In each period, the "proposal" by an individual
of type i is the policy that maximizes his utility.
The proposal that beats the other two in pairwise comparison is adopted. In the first
period the issue space is therefore bidimensional; as it is well known, in this case the
existence of a winning proposal is not guaranteed in general. However, since there are
only three distinct groups of individuals, the number of proposals that can be voted on is
finite. As shown below, this allows to identify stable majorities even in a bidimensional
issue space. Note also that, in period 1, each proposal wins or loses as a whole: in other
words, when the proposals by agents A and B are compared pairwise, it is not possible
to vote for, say, the tax rate proposed by agents A and the value of X proposed by
agents B.
3 The benchmark: the representative agent econ-
omy.
An analysis of the representative agent version of the economy described so far helps
isolate the specific role of income distribution in this model. The representative agent
version of the model is obtained as a special case of the setup of section 2, namely by
assuming that there is no dispersion in the endowments of labor, so that n^ = rig =
nc = 1.
Intuitively, when all agents have the same income, the fiscal system cannot transfer
resources across agents. The only reason to have an unbalanced government budget
or current account would be to transfer resources across the two periods. In fact, with
non-distortionary taxation, the representative agent can effectively borrow and lend at
the world interest rate through the government. However, as long as the economy is rich
enough that an agent earns more at home than abroad, the two periods look exactly the
same, and the utility of the representative agents is maximized at a balanced government
budget and current account.
The following proposition describes formally the behavior of the representative agent
economy:
Proposition 1.
(i) For all values of 0, in the representative agent version of the model the government
budget and the current account are always balanced.
(ii) For 0 sufficiently large - specifically, for 6 > 1 — d, production and consumption are
the same in the two periods, i.e. the economy exhibits perfect consumption smoothing.
Proof.
(i) Note first that each individual is indifferent to the tax rate, for when all agents have
the same income, at any tax rate they pay in taxes what they receive in transfers. Thus,
from now on the analysis can focus on the only remaining policy variable, the budget
deficit and current account X. It is easy to show that borrowing a positive amount
X > 0 is dominated by a strategy involving a balanced current account, X — 0. Sup-
pose that the government borrows X > 0 in period 1. It is easy to see that there are only
two possible outcomes in period 2: either all agents stay, or all agents leave. Suppose
first that all agents stay in period 2: their consumption is 6 -f X in period 1 and 0 — X in
period 2. This is clearly dominated by a strategy involving a balanced current account
X = 0, which gives the same lifetime income but a perfectly smooth consumption path
of 0 in each period. Now suppose that all agents leave in period 2, in which case they can
escape repaying the debt. But then, the government will find it impossible to borrow in
period 1. Similarly, it is easy to show that X = 0 dominates X < 0, i.e. any strategy
that involves lending a non-zero amount in period 1. This proves the first part of the
proposition.
(ii) As long as 0 > 1 — d, all agents stay in perod 2, and by part (i) of this proposition
they produce and consume 0 in each period. Thus, for 0 "sufficiently large", the produc-
tion and consumption paths of the representative agent are also perfectly flat over time.n
The basic message of this proposition is that income dispersion is the crucial assumption
of the model. Without income dispersion, the assumption that private agents cannot
borrow or lend privately is irrelevant, because they can borrow and lend through the
government at the world interest rate. It is therefore not surprising that this economy
delivers exactly the same predictions as the neoclassical model.
Note also that temporary and permanent shocks will induce the familiar patterns of
borrowing and lending.3 For instance, an anticipated future negative shock will induce
a government budget and current account surplus, while a pemanent negative shock will
be absorbed in the same proportion in each period and will not induce any imbalance
in the government budget or in the current account.
3This is strictly true as long as these shocks are not so large as to induce all agents to move abroad
in period 2.
4 The case of income dispersion: introduction.
Before solving formally the case of positive income dispersion, it is useful to discuss
and simplify its structure, with the goal of simplifying the exposition without sacrificing
the main insights. As it is, the model has many free parameters, which would make
the exposition particularly cumbersome. In particular, given the per capita income
of the economy 0, there are four free parameters that characterize the distribution of
income: two n,'s and two p,'s. A given change in, say, the Gini coefficient can arise
from movements in the endowments nt of the various groups or from movements in their
sizes pi, or both. Hence, very little is lost in terms of the analysis of the role of income
distribution if one fixes the sizes p^s of the various groups at some specific value. On
the other hand, this assumption simplifies the exposition and the notation substantially.
Thus, from now on I will assume the following values for the sizes of the various groups:
PA=PB = 1,PC = \.
Still, even after fixing the sizes p,'s, any movement in the endowment of one group
can be accompanied by very different patterns of movements in the endowments of the
other two groups, leading to a situation where practically anything could happen. The
solution of the model would have to consider all possible cases, and would turn out to
be lengthy and tedious. Hence, in order to parametrize the distribution of income in a
compact way, I assume that the low income class is unproductive: HA = 0. Pinning down
the value of TIA has the important implication that given the sizes p,'s, the endowments
of the other two groups are monotonically and negatively related: nc = [1 — PBnB\fpc-
It is then straightforward to show that frequently used measures of inequality like the
Gini coefficient are completely characterized by the value of nc or, equivalently, rig.
Moreover, the two Lorenz curves corresponding to two different values of nc do not
intersect: an increase in nc is therefore associated unambiguously with an increase in
inequality. Note also that a mean-preserving spread in the distribution of income is
necessarily associated with an increase in nc- Thus, in this model the terms "increase
in inequality" and "high inequality" will be synonymous with "increase in nc (decrease
in njj)" and "high value of nc (low value of n#)", respectively.
Because the values of n# or nc completely characterize the distribution of income, it
is useful to provide a few reference points. When inequality is at a minimum, n# = nc
and both are equal to 5/3 [5/3 = (1 — PAnA)/(PB + Pc), after substituting the specific
values assumed above for all the parameters in this expression]. At the other extreme,
when inequality is at a maximum, ng = 0 and nc — 5 [5 = (1 ~PA^A — P 5 ^ B ) / P C , again
after substituting in the specific values assumed above and ng = 0]. Also, of particular
importance in the analysis of the model is whether ng is greater or smaller than the
average endowment 1, since in the former case both agents B and C favor the lowest
possible tax rate, while in the latter case both groups A and B favor the highest possible
tax rate, 1. For future reference, rts < 1 implies TIQ > 3.
There is also a second, more substantive reason for fixing n^ at 0, besides a clearer
exposition. This assumption captures the existence of consistent segments of the popula-
tion that are outside the production process and whose consumption is therefore closely
tied to the extent of redistribution in the economy. These segments of the population
therefore represent a powerful constituency whose only goal is to maximize redistribu-
tion. Group A in this model captures exactly this notion.
Because the focus of the paper is on the role of the distribution of income rather
than factor mobility per se, the exposition and notation of the model can be further
simplified without sacrificing much in terms of insights by restricting also the cost of
moving abroad, d. For convenience, I assume that d is equal to the average endowment
of labor of the home country, 1. Note that this assumption implies that 0 is always
"sufficiently large" in the terminology of Proposition 1, i.e. that 0 > 1 — d = 0, so
that a representative agent economy would always exhibit perfectly flat production and
consumption paths over time.
Another important issue concerns the possible existence of multiple equilibria. For
some values of the debt and of the other parameters, in this model there might be more
than one equilibrium. To illustrate the nature of this issue, suppose the country borrows
D in period 1, and in period 2 the tax rate is just what is needed to repay the debt. 4
If all agents B and C stay in period 2, this tax rate is defined by T20 = D. Agents C's
consumption in this case would be ric(0 — D). If all agents C leave while all agents B
stay, the tax rate will be such that r2|^njg = D. An agent C that deviates and decides
to stay would therefore consume nc(0— f ~ ) , while if he leaves he consumes nc — l. For
some values of Z), one could have nc(9 — | ~ ) < nc ~ 1 < nc{6 — D). Hence, for a range
of values of D there would be three Nash equilibria, one with all agents C staying, one
with all leaving, and one with some agents C staying. Since the focus of this paper is not
on multiple equilibria, I assume that in these cases the first, Pareto-superior equilibrium
is chosen5. The same assumption applies also to agents B.6
4As shown below, this occurs for instance when nc > 1 and n# > 1, so that both groups vote for
the minimum tax rate required to repay the debt.
5In addition, note that the second equilibrium is unstable.
6Appendix A explores more formally the implications of this assumption.
5 Equilibrium policies in a poor economy.
The problem solved by all agents in an economy with positive income dispersion is
fundamentally different from that of the representative agent economy: since taxation is
proportional but redistribution is lump-sum, any reallocation of consumption between
the two periods through the government budget also implies some redistribution of
lifetime income across the three groups. It is this property of the government budget
that can induce patterns of fiscal policy and external borrowing which are inconsistent
with the logic of the representative agent model. Moreover, whether and to what extent
this can happen depends critically on the level of income per capita and on the degree
of inequality.
I begin the analysis of the effects of income dispersion with the case of a poor econ-
omy. I define a poor economy as an economy where 6 < 1/2. One important implication
of this inequality is that, because productivity at home is so low, an agent with a suffi-
ciently large endowment will leave in period 2. Thus, there is a specific sense in which
poor economies are more vulnerable to inequality in the distribution of income. In fact,
the key result of this section is that a poor economy with very low inequality will exhibit
perfect consumption smoothing and balanced current account and government budget;
however, as inequality increases the economy displays a surprisingly different behavior
from that of a representative agent economy, and can exhibit highly counterintuitive
patterns of the consumption path and the current account. In fact, at high levels of in-
equality, a majority consisting of the two groups at the extreme ends of the distribution
of income, A and C, support a policy involving borrowing the maximum possible amount
in period 1, even though production is already higher in period 1 than in period 27. As
inequality increases further, a majority composed of groups A and B support a policy
that smooths aggregate consumption partially, involving a current account surplus.
I provide here the main intuition for this result, leaving a formal proof to Appendix
B. At the heart of the result are the different incentives of agents C to move abroad at
different levels of inequality^ Recall that an agent of type C will move abroad in period
7To avoid a tedious list of all possible cases, I also assume here the more interesting case of 9 > 2/5.
This ensures that, when ns > 1, the income of agents B if they stay and there is no debt to repay,
0UB, is not less than what they could earn abroad, n# — 1. Thus, agents B stay as long as the debt is
not too high. If instead 6UQ < rig — 1, agents B would leave even at X = 0, and the country cannot
borrow any amount in period 1 since no agent with positive endowment would be left to repay it in
period 2. The resulting equilibrium would be trivial to analyse. If n# < 1, agents B cannot leave and
the equilibrium would be similar to that derived in this section. The case 9 < 2/5 can be analysed
easily along the lines of this section, but it does not add any important insight to the main intuition.
8Agents B could also move abroad in period 2, when their endowment of labor is above the cost of
moving, 1. However, it is intuitive that, if agents B move, agents C also move (see Appendix A), and
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2 whenever the differential between consumption at home and abroad is negative. If all
agents are present in the economy, so that the average income is 6, this differential is
(1 — T<i)Qnc •+- (T2# — X) — (nc — 1), where the first two terms represent consumption
at home (see expression (3) and its explanation) and the third represents consumption
abroad. Hence, there are three determinants of the consumption differential in period 2.
First, the pre-tax income differential One — (nc — 1): a t l ° w levels of ric, this differential
is positive; as nc increases, the incidence of the moving cost in total income abroad falls,
and past some value of nc this differential becomes negative, and increasing in absolute
value. Second, the tax rate: since agents C have above-average income, their post-tax
income at home is a decreasing function of the tax rate. Third, the current account: if
the country borrowed a positive debt X > 0 in period 1, the debt repayment reduces
consumption in period 2 for an agent C who decides to stay.
When inequality is in a region around its minimum value, nc = 5/3, all three com-
ponents of the consumption differential in period 2 work in favor of agents C staying.
At low level of inequality, the pre-tax income differential is positive; in addition, because
agents B too have above-average endowment, if agents C stay in period 2 both groups
B and C will vote for the lowest possible tax rate. The overall utility of both groups B
and C is then maximized when T\ = r2 = 0 and X — 0. Under this policy, both groups
smooth consumption perfectly and maximize their lifetime income, since as we have seen
above at r = 0 both groups earn more at home than abroad.9
When r2 = 0, X = 0, the consumption of agents C in each period is One, their
pre-tax income, and the consumption differential in period 2 is just One — (nc — 1)- As
inequality increases, and so does nc, this differential, although still positive, becomes
very small. Therefore, after some point nc, the policy that maximizes agents C's utility
changes drastically. Rather than smoothing consumption perfectly, agents C can leave
the country in period 2, and maximize consumption in period 1 by having the government
borrow the maximum possible amount X = Dmax10. In fact, once they leave the country
in period 2, any increase in period 1 consumption obtained by borrowing from abroad
comes at no cost to them in terms of period 2 consumption. Relative to the previous
policy, this causes a fall in period 2's consumption from One to nc — 1. However, this is
the country cannot borrow any amount. The maximum debt that the country can incur, therefore,
is the debt that leaves agents B indifferent between staying and moving. As argued in the previous
footnote, for 6 > 2/5 this debt is positive. Therefore, in this intuitive exposition of the solution one
can concentrate on the decision to leave of agents C only.
9Because the consumption differential is decreasing in n<, if it is positive for agents C, a fortiori it
is positive for agents B.
10As shown in Appendix A, Dmax is that value of borrowing that leaves agents B indifferent between
staying in period 2 and repaying the debt, or leaving and consuming One — 1
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'max'
more than compensated by the increased period 1 consumption from One to One -f DT
Thus, past a certain value n^,, agents C propose T\ — 0 and X = Dmax, and then leave
the country.
At still higher levels of nc, the pre-tax income differential One — (nc — 1) becomes
negative even at X = 0. Hence, even if there is no debt to be repaid and T<I = 0, agents C
certainly leave in period 2. A fortiori, then agents C will propose Tj = 0 and X = Dmax
in period 1.
Importantly, whenever agents C leave the country in period 2, agents A too propose
borrowing the highest possible amount Dmax. The fundamental reason is that, once
agents C have moved abroad, there is no redistribution of labor income in period 2, as the
only group left with positive endowment, group B, clearly opposes any redistribution to
agents A. Hence, the tax rate in period 2 will be just enough to repay the debt contracted
in period 1. But then, any borrowing in period 1 increases agents A's consumption at no
cost in terms of their period 2's consumption. Clearly, agents A too propose borrowing
the highest possible amount in period 1, X = Dmax. Thus, in an interval to the right of
nc, a majority composed of the two groups at the extremes of the distribution of income
votes for X = Dmax. However, the two groups diverge on the preferred tax rate: agents
C prefer T\ = 0, agents A Tj = 1. As long as n# > 1, the former prevails, because agents
B prefer C's proposal to A's proposal: both have the same level of debt Dmax, but at
least the former has the tax rate that agents B prefer, T\ = 0.
When inequality increases further, so that rig falls below 1, a fortiori agents C will
leave in period 2 and vote for X = Dmax in period 1. In fact, at these levels of inequality,
the pre-tax income differential is already negative; in addition, if they stayed, the tax
rate in period 2 would be 1, as both groups A and B now would have below-average
endowments. The logic of the model, however, remains the same: it is still true that
a majority composed of groups A and C vote for X = Dmax in period 1. The only
difference is that now the tax rate in period 1 will be 1 rather than 0, since agents B
now prefer A's proposal (involving X — Dmax and T\ = 1) to C's proposal (also involving
X = Dmax but n = 0).
When inequality increases still further, past a certain value nc, the position of agents
A changes. At these levels of inequality, rig is very small and therefore Dmax is also very
small11. When Dmax is small, it does not pay for agents A to give up consumption
smoothing in order to consume everything in period 1. Rather, they prefer a policy
involving perfect consumption smoothing, which implies lending some of the tax revenues
11In fact, when HB < 1 agents B cannot move and therefore Dmax is equal to the aggregate income
of agents B, \0TIB, which is decreasing in nc.
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collected in period 1 (recall that the equilibrium tax rate is 1 in period 1). As agents B
too would like to lend, a policy with rx = 1 and X < 0 prevails in equilibrium. Thus,
at very high levels of inequality the country lends a positive amount, and the policy has
the support of the two groups A and B.
The following proposition summarizes the results of this section:
Proposition 2.
(i) At very low levels of inequality (for nc > nc, with nc < 3), the average income
and consumption of a poor economy are the same in each period. As the distribution
of income becomes more unequal (for nc G (nc,nc), with nc > 3), the average income
declines over time, yet the economy runs budget and current account deficits in period 1.
At still higher levels of inequality (for nc > nc), the economy runs budget and current
account surpluses in period 1.
(ii) Except at very low and very high levels of inequality, the winning proposal involves
high budget and current account deficits, which are supported by the two groups at the
opposite extremes of the distribution of income, A and C.
Proof.
See Appendix B.
Thus, when inequality is high, although not extreme - for nc 6 (nCj nc) - the country
borrows the largest possible amount it can repay. This occurs despite the fact that the
average income is higher in period 1 than in period 2. Hence, to an outside observer
the economy exhibits a perverse pattern of budget deficits and external borrowing: the
average income declines over time, and consumption declines even faster. This is true
even if one considers only the average income of the two groups of agents that remain
in the country in both periods, A and B: their disposable income is higher in period
1 than in period 2, yet the pattern of borrowing amplifies this asymmetry rather than
smoothing it.
One puzzling aspect of these experiences is the fact that this drastic reversal of
policies can be easily anticipated, and seems therefore inconsistent with any rational,
forward-looking behavior on the part of private individuals and policymakers alike.
In the existing literature on the topic (e.g. Alesina and Drazen (1991), Laban and
Sturzenegger (1992), Velasco (1992)), delays in stabilization result from the failure of
the two groups to agree on the distribution of the costs and on the features of a stabiliza-
tion. As time passes, the costs of the inefficient policy become so large that eventually
stabilization takes place. The models differ in exactly how and why the stabilization
13
takes place. In Alesina and Drazen, each group is imperfectly informed on the costs
of the stabilization to the other group; after engaging in a "war of attrition" with the
other, eventually one group concedes and bears most of the costs of the stabilization. In
Velasco, after the inefficient policy has been in place for some time, an equilibrium in
which all groups agree to the new policy becomes sustainable. In Laban and Sturzeneg-
ger, one group is increasingly affected by the inefficient policy and eventually becomes
willing to agree to a stabilization with uncertain results.
In this model, similar outcomes stem from the interplay of factor mobility and re-
distributive fiscal policy in the presence of high inequality and perfectly rational and
forward-looking agents. A distinctive feature of this model is that its dynamics is gen-
erated by the interaction of three, rather than two, groups. This framework captures
two important features of many of episodes of delays in stabilization. First, difficulties
in stabilizing an economy seem to be correlated with high inequality in the distribution
of income (see Berg and Sachs (1988) for some evidence on the correlation between ex-
ternal borrowing and inequality). Second, the initial fiscal expansion is often backed by
both the trade unions and the associations of industrialists, in the latter case because
the high resulting level of demand leads to high profits (see Dornbusch and Edwards
(1990)). Both features appear, albeit highly stylized, in this model: when the distribu-
tion of income is unequal, the two groups at the extremes of the distributon of income,
A and C, support an expansionary fiscal policy financed by high budget and current
account deficits, at the expense of the middle group, B.
Note also that the equilibrium policy involving maximum borrowing is the preferred
outcome of agents C only for nc € (n c ,3] . For nc € (3,n^), the equilibrium policy
implies T\ = 1, which agents C dislike. However, this policy is still preferred to agents
B's proposal, since it allows agents C a higher consumption in period 1 while still enabling
them to escape all the costs of the stabilization.
6 Equilibrium policies in a rich economy.
In contrast to poor economies, rich economies exhibit perfectly flat output and con-
sumption paths over time regardless of how income is distributed. Thus, to an outside
observer these economies appear isomorphic to the representative agent economy of sec-
tion 3. The basic intuition is simple. Consider a rich economy, with 9 > 4. In this
economy, if there is no debt to be repaid, the richest possible individual of type C, with
nc = 5, still consumes more at home when the tax rate is 1 and he only gets the average
income 0, than abroad, where he gets nc — 1. Thus, in this economy, agents C never leave
the country if X = 0, whatever tax policy is implemented. A fortiori, this is true for
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agents B, who have a lower endowment and therefore benefit less from moving abroad.
A majority of agents can therefore maximize their lifetime income by implementing in
each period the tax rate they prefer (r = 0, supported by groups B and C if n^ > 1, or
r = 1, supported by groups A and B if ng < 1) and smooth consumption at the same
time by having a balanced current account.
The following proposition develops this intuition formally:
Proposition 3.
At any level of inequality, the aggregate income and consumption paths of a rich econ-
omy are identical to those of a representative agent economy with the same average
income: in particular, the budget and the current account are always balanced.
Proof.
Consider first the case of low inequality, where TLQ < 3, or, equivalently, n# > 1. Since
both agents B and C have above average endowments, both groups dislike taxation and
redistribution, and propose the lowest possible tax rate in each period. In addition,
both groups also propose a perfectly balanced government budget and current account.
Intuitively, at T\ — 0, X = 0 and r2 = 0, disposable income and consumption are the
same in the two periods and lifetime income is maximized. In fact, because both groups
have above-average endowments, there is no linear redistributive scheme that increases
their lifetime disposable income.
Now consider the case of high inequality, where nc > 3, or, equivalently, ng < 1. If
agents C are present in period 2, both groups A and B have below average endowments,
and therefore both propose r2 = 1. And indeed, as shown above, if there is no debt
to be repaid agents C are present in period 2, even when r2 = 1. It is then clear that
at T\ = 1, X = 0 and r2 = 1, agents A and B can maximize their lifetime income and
achieve perfect consumption smoothing.D
Hence, in a rich economy a majority of agents always favor a balanced budget and current
account. The same majority also favors a policy of no redistribution when inequality
is low, and the largest possible redistribution when inequality is high. To an outside
observer, a rich economy with income inequality is indistinguishable from an economy
with no income dispersion, and from the representative agent, neoclassical model.
At levels of income between a poor and a rich economy, i.e. for 6 £ (1/2,4), the
logic of the model is unchanged. However, under some configurations of the distribution
of income some complications arise regarding the definition of an equilibrium and the
existence of a non-cycling majority. I illustrate the nature of these problems and some
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possible solutions in Appendix D.
7 The effects of shocks.
The differences between rich and poor economies, and between equal and unequal so-
cieties, extend to their responses to exogenous shocks. Two types of shocks in this
model generate interesting implications: shocks to productivity and to the distribution
of endowments.
As an example of the effects of productivity shocks, consider a permanent negative
shock, i.e. a permanent fall in 0. Both an economy with no income dispersion at any
level of income or a rich economy with any degree of dispersion will respond exactly
as in the neoclassical model, by reducing the consumption in both periods by the same
amount. Thus, the government budget and the current account will remain perfectly
balanced and there will be no distributional effects.
The response of a poor economy can be remarkably different, however. As an exam-
ple, suppose inequality is low, so that nc is slightly below nlc, as defined in section 5. In
other words, initially both groups B and C vote for T\ = 0, X = 0, and the government
budget and the current account are perfectly balanced. As shown formally in Appendix
E, a permanent fall in 0 causes a fall in nc, i.e. an enlargement of the interval over
which agents C propose X = Dmax rather than X = 0. The intuition is simple: when 0
falls, the consumption of agents C when X = 0, 0nc, falls proportionally in each period.
When X = Dmax, however, their consumption falls only in the first period, because in
the second period they move abroad, where they consume nc — l independent of 0; hence,
this policy becomes more attractive at any level of nc. After the fall in #, then, agents
C might propose T\ = 0 and X = Dmax, while before they proposed TX = 0, X = 0. As
agents A too favor the highest possible debt, the economy might respond to a perma-
nent shock by switching from perfectly balanced budget and current accounts with no
redistribution to a policy of the highest possible external indebtedness.12 Since the debt
is redistributed to agents A, this shock has also important distributional effects.
Now consider shocks to the distribution of endowments, such as an increase in the
Gini coeffcient. As explained in section 4, in this model any change in inequality must
correspond to a movement of nc in one direction with a corresponding movement of UB
in the opposite direction. In particular, a mean-preserving spread or an increase in the
Gini coefficient are all equivalent to an increase in nc-
12Appendix E shows that the fall in 9 makes it less attractive for agents A to vote for Dmax rather
than for agents B's proposal. However, it might still be true that at the new value of nlc agents A
fer Dpre  Dmax.
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Once again, the government budget and the current account of a rich economy are
immune from an increase in inequality: both remain perfectly balanced, so that aggre-
gate production and consumption too remain perfectly flat over time. At most, the tax
rate changes from 0 to 1 in both periods, if the increase in inequality drives ng, the
income of the median group, below the average income. In a poor economy, however,
an increase in inequality can have a dramatic effect on the current account. For in-
stance, now an increase in inequality that causes UQ to rise above n^., again shifts the
equilibrium policy from a balanced current account to the maximum possible external
indebtedness.13
In summary, in this model permanent productivity or income distribution shocks
might not be absorbed equally over time, contrary to the predictions of the neoclassical
model. Rather, they can induce responses in aggregate production and consumption
that have a highly unbalanced temporal profile.
8 Private borrowing and lending.
So far, private agents were prevented from borrowing and lending. Removing this as-
sumption means that individuals can now propose the value of X that maximizes their
lifetime income, using the private credit markets to smooth consumption by allocating
the lifetime income evenly between the two periods.
Thus, allowing for private borrowing and lending has two important effects in this
model. First, it encourages even more extreme patterns of fiscal policy and external bor-
rowing or lending by the government, since individuals are not prevented from proposing
extreme values of X by the need to smooth consumption. Second, it gives rise to a si-
multaneous two-way flow of resources, with private flows going in opposite direction to
official flows, exactly because individuals use the private credit markets to smooth the
path of consumption relative to income.
However, these two results obtain only in poor economies with high inequality. As
shown in sections 5 and 6, in rich economies or in poor economies with low inequality,
in the absence of private credit markets the equilibrium tax rate is the same in both
periods and the current account is always balanced. Hence, a majority of agents already
maximize lifetime income and smooth consumption at this policy. As a consequence,
there is no need to compensate with private borrowing or lending when private credit
markets are opened.
By contrast, opening up private credit markets in poor economies with high inequality
13Note that, contrary to the case of a productivity shock, now nlc is not affected by the shock.
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has rather drastic consequences on the equilibrium policies. I illustrate the main intuition
by considering the case of a poor economy with high inequality, with nc in a region to
the right of nc, as defined in Section 5.
First, the range of values of nc over which agents C move abroad and propose the
maximum debt becomes larger. In fact, in the absence of private credit markets, agents
C move abroad and vote for X = Dmax whenever this policy gives a higher utility than
the alternative policy involving staying and X = 0. This is exactly the criterion that
defines the cut-off value nc in Proposition 2. With private credit markets, agents C
vote for the first policy, X = Dmax, whenever it gives a higher lifetime income. This
obviously occurs on a wider region of values of nc, including a region to the left of nc,
between some value he and nc. In fact, at nc the lifetime income of agents C was
already higher under the first policy, but lifetime utility was the same because the first
policy implied a more unbalanced income and therefore consumption path. With private
credit markets, however, consumption is delinked from income, and all that matters is
maximizing lifetime income. As the policy of borrowing Dmax still maximizes agents
A's lifetime income, the region where a majority composed of groups A and C propose
X = Dmax becomes larger, and includes the interval between he and nc. Hence, opening
up private credit markets leads to more extreme fiscal policies and official borrowing.
As in section 5, since n# > 1 when nc is close to n^, the winning tax rate in period
1 is Tj = 0. Also, because agents C leave, in period 2 the winning tax rate is just enough
to repay the debt, without any redistribution to agents A. Therefore, under the winning
policy T\ = 0 and X = Dmax the income path of all agents is highly unbalanced. The
post-tax income of agents A is Dmax in period 1 and 0 in period 2. As a consequence,
when private credit markets are opened, agents A will use them to smooth consumption
by lending privately. The same reasoning applies to agents B, who must repay the debt
in period 2. By contrast, agents C have a higher income in period 2, and therefore they
borrow privately in period 1. Thus, the existence of private credit markets leads to a
two-way flow of resources, with private flows going in opposite direction to official flows.
Similarly, at even higher levels of inequality (for nc in an interval [he, 5], with he >
nc), the government runs the highest possible budget surplus and lends abroad all tax
revenues. The reason is that, at these levels of inequality, agents C leave anyway in
period 2. By running a budget surplus and lending abroad, agents A and B effectively
transfer the tax revenues collected in period 1 to period 2, where they do not have to
share them with agents C. Clearly, the lifetime income of agents A and B is maximized
when Ti = 1 and all period 1 national income 0 is transferred to period 2. To balance
their consumption paths, all individuals then borrow privately.
It is also important to emphasize that in this model the government and all the
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private agents face the same world interest rate. As a consequence, there would be no
reason for resources to flow in both directions in a representative agent economy. Here,
the result arises from the combination of a positive dispersion in the distribution of
income and a fiscal system that redistributes resources across different groups.
9 Discussion and conclusions.
This paper has presented a model where income distribution and redistributive fiscal
policy interact to affect the budget deficit and the pattern of net borrowing of a coun-
try. Income distribution is irrelevant at high levels of income, but becomes a major
determinant of the shape of the aggregate consumption path at low levels of income.
Furthermore, while a rich economy behaves according to the traditional paradigm, a
poor economy with an unequal income distribution might follow a consumption path
which is essentially the opposite of that posited by standard theories.
It is interesting to compare these conclusions with those of the representative agent
model of Dornbusch (1983). There, the presence of a non-traded good creates a wedge
between the world real interest rate and the marginal rate of transformation facing the
representative agent whenever the price of the non-traded good is changing over time. In
the present model too the underlying driving force is a wedge between the world interest
rate and the marginal rate of transformation perceived by the agents of the economy.
However, here the difference is not due to the changing price of the composite non-
traded good. Rather, the existence of a redistributive system that allocates the costs of
debt repayment asymmetrically across income groups means that the low income and
high income groups might face a very low marginal rate of transformation, which can
be even 0 in the limit. This of course might create a strong constituency in favor of a
high budget deficit and external borrowing.
It is also interesting to compare the rationale for budget deficits in this model to that
of Tabellini and Alesina (1990) and Alesina and Tabellini (1990). There, the median
voter in period 1 is uncertain about the future median voter's identity and preferences
over a public good. By running a budget deficit, a risk-averse median voter in period 1
can therefore constrain the future median voter to use future tax revenues to repay the
debt, rather than to spend on a public good that he might dislike. In these contributions
as well as in the model of my paper the driving force behind the existence of budget
deficits is that the future looks different from the present from the viewpoint of the
current majority. The two explanations differ in what causes this asymmetry between
the two periods. In Tabellini and Alesina (1990) and Alesina and Tabellini (1990), the
cause is a random shock to preferences. In my model, it is the interplay between factor
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mobility and redistribution.
In a similar vein, Alesina and Tabellini (1989) present an explanation for the simul-
taneous existence of private and official flows which differs from that developed in this
paper. In their model, two classes, capitalists and workers, alternate in office with given
probabilities. When capitalists are in office, they might decide to borrow from abroad
in order to constrain the choice of the future policymakers. At the same time, they
might export some capital as a form of insurance against future changes in policy. In
my model, private capital flows are not due to uncertainty about the future, but to the
desire to smooth consumption in the presence of large imbalances in the government
budget and the current account.
Several assumptions of the model deserve further discussion. First, the model as-
sumes that an individual can escape taxation by moving abroad. In the real world, the
phenomenon of actual migration of individuals with all their human capital in response
to taxation is relatively rare, and of limited macroeconomic significance. However, the
assumption that individuals can move abroad can be easily reinterpreted as capturing
the possibility of escaping high tax rates by exiting the formal sector, which can be done
at a cost. This reinterpretation would require very little changes in the structure of the
model. In particular, one only needs to impose the additional, reasonable condition that
an individual that operates illegally in the underground economy and therefore does not
pay taxes is not entitled to any redistribution.
The model can also accomodate, in a more stylized manner, other important phenom-
ena that are highly influenced by fiscal policy. One could reinterpret the endowment of
labor of the rich and mobile agents as capital. Although migration of physical capital in
response to fiscal conditions is also rare, large drops in investment rates are frequently
observed in response to macroeconomic imbalances and mismanagement. The act of
moving capital abroad in the second period captures in a stylized way the effects of
letting the capital stock depreciate at home while investing resources abroad. The rapid
decadence of the manufacturing sector during prolonged periods of overvaluation of the
real exchange rate in Latin America is an example of this phenomenon.
A prolonged fall in investment has at least two effects on the disposable income of
the immobile factors that combine with capital in the production function: it reduces
their pre-tax income, and it reduces the tax base and therefore the resources available
for redistribution. Because it has only one non-accumulable factor, the present model
can rigorously capture only the second type of effect. To capture the first effect, it would
be necessary not only to add a second factor, capital, but also a second intertemporal
problem, how much capital to accumulate. This problem would have to be solved to-
gether with the problem of whether to move capital or not in the second period. It is
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easy to see that the model would quickly become very difficult to handle.
Furthermore, the advantage of having only one factor with a linear production func-
tion is that the reward to that factor per unit provided is constant regardless of the total
employment of the factor in the economy. Consequently, changes in income distribution
are easy to track. If the economy produces two goods, factor rewards would still be
constant because of the factor price equalization theorem, and movements in income
distribution would still be fairly easy to trace. However, once enough capital has moved
abroad in response to taxation, the economy would specialize in the production of one
good, and factor rewards would become endogenous. The model would again become
extremely difficult to handle.
Fortunately, however, these complications are not necessary. In the present model,
the tax base is mobile in the long run. When part of the tax base escapes taxation,
because of the linearity of production factor rewards do not change; however, the second
effect of a fall in investment and the capital stock, namely the reduction in tax revenues
for redistribution, is still present. This is enough to generate the dynamics the model
focuses on. The first effect, namely the drop in the reward to the immobile factor, would
make the model more realistic, but the underlying logic would be the same.
The act of moving abroad in this model could also be thought of as a proxy for capital
flights, which are typically associated with mismanagement of fiscal policy. Strictly
speaking, capital flights are difficult to capture in this model for two reasons. First,
there is no room for financial instruments that can be moved quickly into a different
denomination; second, in the first part of the model I assume that private individuals
cannot borrow and lend, which would be difficult to reconcile with the existence of capital
flights. However, the important feature of capital flights from the point of view of the
logic of this model is that they are typically associated with a decline in investment and
therefore in the standards of living. Thus, the model seems to be able to capture the
events typically associated with capital flights.
A second important assumption concerns the treatment of debt. In this model, the
only role of the government is to redistribute income. As in all real, dynamic models,
there are two ways to finance government expenditure: taxation and debt. Hence, in this
model government debt accomplishes two tasks at once: it redistributes income across
individuals with different lifetime incomes, and it shifts consumption from one period
to the other. In principle, the redistributive and intertemportal allocative function
of the government budget could be separated. The former can be accomplished by
taxing labor proportionally and redistributing the proceeds lump-sum. The latter can
be accomplished by distributing the debt proportionally to each individual's income, and
taxing individuals proportionally to repay it. However, this would make government debt
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equivalent to forcing individuals to borrow privately a given proportion of their income,
which seems highly unrealistic.
Note that, when voluntary private borrowing and lending is allowed, as in the second
part of the paper, there is still a role for government borrowing and lending: the reason
is precisely that governmnet borrowing and lending is a way to finance redistribution in
a given period, over and above the tax revenues collected in that period. This illustrates
the importance of considering the redistributive role of government in models of open
economies, and not just its allocative role, i.e. purchases of goods and services.
A third important assumption of the model is that each individual proposes the
policy that maximizes his utility and votes sincerely. As it is often the case, allowing for
strategic voting could introduce significant complications: the outcome would depend on
the allowable strategies and on the definition of equilibrium one adopts. However, in this
particular model strategic voting is unlikely to change the results significantly. First, it
is clear that every time the same proposal maximizes the utility of at least two groups,
allowing for strategic voting would have no effect on the outcome, as neither group would
have any incentive to make a different proposal. Second, if the three proposals are all
different, a stable winner under sincere voting exists whenever a proposal is a "median
in all directions", i.e. its tax rate is intermediate between the tax rates of the other two
proposals and the same is true for its external borrowing. In this case, the median in
all directions is the most reasonable and intuitive winner under sincere voting, since the
other two proposals are at the opposite extremes on both dimensions. It is unlikely that
strategic voting can reshuffle proposals as to put together these two "extreme" proposals.
In most of the cases explicitly analysed in the paper, there is a median in all directions;
consequently, the results presented here appear to be quite robust to strategic voting.
However, for those configurations that do not have a non-cycling majority under sincere
voting, it is difficult to predict what effects strategic voting would have on the existence
and the characteristics of the equilibrium.
Note however that sincere voting does not mean that voters are irrational or myopic.
In fact, in this model voters are perfectly forward-looking, as they take into account
the effects of their first period proposal, if it prevails, on the economic and political
equilibria of the economy in the second period.
Finally, an important feature of the model presented in this paper is that it allows
both for repeated voting and a bidimensional issue space. In general, the median voter
result does not apply in this case. However, by allowing only the preferred policies of
each agent as admissible proposals, a stable majority can be identified in this model.
Furthermore, in this setup the interesting possibility arises that the winning policy is
the proposal of one of the two groups at the extreme ends of the distribution of income.
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Appendix A.
This Appendix shows how the maximum possible debt in period 1, Dmax, varies with
rtC' For expository purposes, I consider two cases separately, first when nB > 1 and
then when nB < 1. In both cases, I consider the case of a poor economy, 0 < 1/2.
nge[f,3].
Suppose the country borrows the amount D in period 1. Because nB > 1 and rtc > 1,
in period 2 both groups B and C vote for the minimum tax rate required to repay D.
There are three cases:
(i) If all agents saty, the tax base is 0 and the tax rate is D/0. Therefoe, all agents
stay if and only if:
nc(0-D)>nc-l, nB(0 - D) > nB - 1 (A.I)
(n) When 0 < 1, if inequality (A.I) is satisfied for agents C, it is also satisfied for
agents B. Therefore, outside case (i), necessarily nc{9 — D) < nc — 1 or, in other words,
D is larger than
O, (fl-i + JL)} (A.2)
and all agents C leave14. Once agents C leave, the maximum debt that the country can
incur is then limited by the fact that it must be repaid by agents B only. Hence, once
agents C have left, D must be such that
0nB --D>nB-l (A.3)
This implicitly defines the maximum possible debt D^ax that can be incurred after
agents C leave as
^ JO, 0-3/5 + in c( l -0)} (A.4)
Hence, there are two possibilities outside case (i). In the first case, D^ax > D^ax and
the maximum possible debt is -D^aar, so that agents C stay. In fact, if the country tried
to borrow more in period 1, agents C would leave, but then agents B would leave too,
and there would be nobody left to repay the debt.
(Hi) Conversely, if D^ax > D^ax, the country can borrow up to D^ax, as agents B
stay even after agents C have left.
14Recall that, when both all agents C staying and all leaving is a Nash equilibrium, by assumption
the former, Pareto-superior equilibrium prevails.
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Therefore, one can define Dmax as:
{ l c } (A.5)
Note that D^ax is increasing and D^ax decreasing in nc- It is then easy to show that
there is a value of nc, n'c, such that Dmax = D^ax for nc £ [|, nc) while Dmax =
for nc G [n'c-,3]. For future reference, note that n'c < Tyr^ y.
When ns < 1, agents B cannot move abroad. Also, now D^ax = 0, as agents C
certainly leave even for D = 0. Therefore, the maximum debt once agents C have left is
the aggregate income of agents B:
Dmax = D^ax = I ^ B (A.6)
Note that now Dmax is always decreasing in nc-
Appendix B.
This appendix proves Proposition 2. Because all agents are rational and forward-looking,
the equilibrium is determined by backward induction. First, the equilibrium in period
2 is determined as a function of the policy adopted in period 1. Then, in period 1
each individual proposes the policy that maximizes his utility, taking into account the
effects of the policy on period 2's outcome. The equilibrium policy in period 1 is then
determined by finding the winning proposal. I determine each group's proposal in turn,
starting from group C. As in Appendix A, it is useful to consider first the case of ns > 1,
and then ns < 1.
1. n g € [ | t 3 ]
Agents C.
Because both groups B and C have above-average endowment, both propose the lowest
possible tax rate in period 2. In particular, this means that, in equilibrium, T2 = 0 if
X = 0. In period 1, clearly agents C always propose the lowest possible rl5 which is
positive only if the country is a net lender in period 1.
Consider initially values of nc such that One > nc — 1, i.e. nc G [§, y^] . Only two
policies can conceivably be optimal for agents C. First, they can stay in period 2 and
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smooth consumption perfectly at Tj = 0,X = 0, thus consuming One in each period.
This policy clearly dominates all others such that agents C stay in period 2, i.e. any
policy with X<QOTO<X< D^ax. Alternatively, agents C can leave the country
in period 2, and maximize period 1 consumption by borrowing the maximum possible
amount Dmax. As shown in Appendix A, this policy is only feasible when D^^ < D!^^,
i.e. for no greater than some value n'c.
Hence, for nc € [§,rcy, the optimal policy for agents C is certainly rx = 0,X = 0.
On an interval (n'c,nj-], with n"c > n'c, both policies are feasible, but the first gives a
higher lifetime income. At nc = nc, the two policies give the same lifetime income,
but the first is still preferred because it allows perfect consumption smoothing. On
the other hand, at nc = y ^ , the second policy gives a higher lifetime income and
utility: it ensures the same period 2 consumption nc — 1 as the first policy, but a higher
period 1 consumption. It is then easy to show that there exists a value nc, between nc
and j30, such that the policy T\ = 0,X = 0 maximizes utility for nc € [f,™^]' while
7i = 0,X — Dmax dominates for nc 6 {nc, y ^ ] .
For higher values of nc-, such that One G (yr^? 3], the second policy is clearly optimal
over the whole interval. In fact, agents C leave under both policies; given this, they can
maximize consumption in period 1 and overall utility by borrowing Dmax.
In summary, agents C propose T\ = 0, X = 0 for nc € [§, nc], and TJ = 0, X = Dmax
for nc G (nc,2], with nc < ^ .
Agents B.
It is easy to see that agents B maximize their lifetime utility at T\ = 0, X = 0.
Agents A.
In period 1, agents A always propose ra = 1 regardless of their proposal on X. Similarly
to the case of agents C, there are only two values of X that can conceivably be optimal
for agents A. First, they can smooth consumption optimally by lending an amount L\.
Under this policy, consumption is 0 — L\ in period 1 and kL*A in period 2, where k
depends on the mass of agents C who are present in period 2. Appendix C shows how
L*A and k vary with nc- Second, since in period 2 no labor income is redistributed,
any debt incurred in period 1 does not entail any cost to agents A in terms of period
2's consumption. Thus, the maximum possible debt, X = Dmax, dominates any other
X > 0. Under this second policy, consumption is 0 + Dmax in period 1 and 0 in period
2.
Thus, the only two candidates as proposals for agents A are T\ = 1, X = — LA and
T\ = 1, X — Dmax- An exhaustive determination of the optimal policy for all values of
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nc in the interval [|,3] would be rather long and tedious. However, the intuition for
the logic of the model can easily be obtained by considering what happens at the two
extremes of the interval.
First, notice that when nc € [|,^cl? the proposal of agents A is irrelevant, as both
groups B and C vote for T\ = 0, X = 0. At the opposite extreme of the interval under
consideration, in a neighborhood of nc — 3, Dmax is equal to Dl^ax and large. Agents A's
lifetime income is then larger under the second policy, r2 = 1 and X = Dmax, although
the first one, T\ = 1 and X = — L\, allows a better smoothing of consumption. Therefore,
for a sufficiently high elasticity of intertemporal substitution, agents A propose the
second policy.
For intermediate values of n^, there might be problems with the existence of an equi-
librium if agents A, B and C propose X = — L*A, X = 0 and X = D m a i , respectively.
In fact, denoting by 0, group i's proposal in period 1, Qc beats Qs, as agents A get 0
in both periods under the latter; Hjg beats fi^, as agents C clearly prefer the former;
and fiA. might (but need not) beat Clc- However, a stable majority certainly exists on
the whole interval [|,3] if agents A propose X = Dmax whenever agents C do, i.e. for
nc E (*ic7,3], s m c e m this case Q,c always prevails in pairwise comparison. Agents A
will indeed propose Dmax for nc € (nc, 3] if the elasticity of substitution is high enough,
for in this case the consumption smoothing motive is not very important and the policy
that maximizes lifetime income gives a higher utility. Under this condition, it is now
relatively easy to establish the equilibrium policies as functions of nc-
Equilibrium policies.
For nc G [ f , ^ ] , the proposals are:
nc- Tt=0,X = Q
nB: n = 0, X = 0
nA: TI = 1, X = Ana* or X = -L\
and obvioulsy T\ = 0, X — 0 is adopted, regardless of group A's proposal. For
n
c £ (^c1?^]? t n e proposals are:
tic'. rx = 0, X = Dmax
QB: n = 0, X = 0
QA' T\ — l i X = Dmax
and Qc defeats in pairwise comparison the other two proposals. In fact, agents A vote
for Sic against fi# because, under the latter, their consumption is 0 in both periods.
Agents B vote for Q,c against Q^ because both proposals imply the same period 2 con-
sumption, but consumption in period 1 is higher under the former.
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2. nc 6(3,5]
The important property of a poor economy with high inequality is that, for virtually
all values of nc, all agents C always leave in period 2, whatever tax and debt policies
are adopted in period 1. In fact, even if T2 = 0, the country lends all its income in
period 1, and all agents C leave in period 2, the disposable income of the marginal agent
C that stays in period 2 would be One + §#, which is certainly less than nc — 1 for
all nc G (Y>5]- In the interval nc 6 (3, y ] , if ^n e country lends an amount X < 0
large enough in absolute value and 0 is large enough, some agents C might stay. In fact,
Appendix D shows that in this case the only Nash equilibrium in period 2 is such that
a mass fit < 1/5 of agents C stay, where //j is defined by One + X/(4/5 + fi\) = nc — 1,
so that agents C are indifferent between staying or moving. This is a Nash equilibrium
because at fi\ n# is certainly higher than the average income of the economy, implying
that indeed T2 = 0. Thus, even in this case, there is never any redistribution of labor
income in period 2, and as before the consumption of agents A is 0 unless the country is
a net lender in period 1. It is then relatively straightforward to determine the proposals
of the various types of agents.
Agents C.
As shown above, agents C always get nc — 1 in period 2. In fact, when nc G (^ ,5] , all
agents C leave regardless of the policy adopted in period 1. When nc G [3, y ] and a
mass y,\ < 1/5 stays (which as shown above can occur only if the country lends a large
amount in period 1) in equilibrium agents C consume nc — 1 in both countries. In both
cases, it is obvious that utility is maximized when period 1 consumption is maximized.
This occurs at T\ = 0, X = Dmax.15
Agents B.
Since ns < 1, agents B certainly propose T\ = 1. Under this proposal, at X = 0 agents
B consume 0 in period 1 and Ong < 0 in period 2. Any borrowing X > 0 would therefore
make consumption even more unbalanced and would decrease lifetime income. In fact,
at these levels of productivity, all agents C leave the country for any X > 0,16 and all
the burden of the debt repayment would be on agents B. Therefore, X > 0 cannot be
optimal for agents B, and they always propose T\ = \,X = —L%.
15Note that, when nc > 3, Dmax - D^as always, since D^ax = \0ns and D^ax - 0.
16Formally, the statement is true because, at these levels of productivity and inequality, One < nc —
"id < 1/2, Vnc > 3.
27
Agents A.
As usual, regardless of their proposal on X agents A always propose TJ = 1. Given this,
the problem they face is similar to the one they solve when nc < 3: they can smooth
consumption by lending an amount LA, or they can maximize period 1 consumption by
borrowing Dmax. The main difference with the case of nc < 3 is that now agents B can-
not move, and therefore Dmax = \0TIB 1S a decreasing function of nc- Consequently, for
a sufficiently high elasticity of intertemporal substitution, the second policy maximizes
utility at low values of nc, in an interval (3, nc).
For nc £ [ ^ ,5 ] , however, Dmax is too low, and it does not pay agents A to give up
smoothing consumption in order to consume 6 -f- Dmax in period 1 and 0 in period 2.
Consequently, the first policy dominates. It is easy to see that L*A, is always larger than
LB. In fact, for any X, the consumption of the two types of agents is the same in period
1, 0 — X, but it is higher for agents B in period 2; in addition, at T\ = 1 the marginal
rate of transformation when lending is the same for both types of agents.
Thus, agents A propose Tj = 1, X — Dmax for nc £ (3,nJ.), and rx — 1, X — —LA
for nc ^
Equilibrium policies.
To summarize, when nc £ (3,nc), the proposals are as follows:
Qc: 7i = 0, X = Dmax
& A- T\ = 1, X = Dmax
and QA defeats in pairwise comparison both QB and ftc In fact, agents C vote for QA
over Ojg since they are taxed at the maximum rate under both flA and fig, but at least
obtain Dmax under QA- Also, agents B prefer f^ to ft^, because their consumption in
period 2 is the same under the two proposals, but consumption in period 1 is higher
under CIA •
When nc 6 [^c^]? ^n e proposals that can be voted on are:
Qc: rj = 0, X = Dr




It is then straightforward to show that QB defeats the other two proposals. In fact,
agents C prefer (Is to 17^  because the tax rate is the same but net lending is lower
under the former. Also, agents A prefer ftjg to flc because they now dislike borrowing
and there is no redistribution of labor income under fic-n
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Appendix C.
This appendix shows how the optimal net lending of agents A, X — —L^, varies with
nc hi a poor economy where nc G [|,3]. Let L > 0 denote the amount the country
lends in period 1. For 0 G [2/5,1/2], all agents B stay for any L, since 0n# > ng — 1
Vn^. The issue is therefore the behavior of agents C. Recalling that r2 = 0 always, there
are several possibilities, depending on the value of nc-
(i) Suppose first One > nc — 15 i.e. " c < 7I3^ T- Clearly, all agents C stay for any L.
Under agents A's proposal Tj = 1, the intertemporal rate of transformation for agents
A is 1, and they can maximize utility by smoothing consumption perfectly. Hence, for
nc G [|l, lip]> perfect consumption smoothing is achieved at L\ = \0.
(ii) Suppose now that One < nc — 1, and that L is such that all agents C have left.
For this to happen, it must be the case that even when L has to be shared with agents
A and B only, an individual of type C is better off abroad: 9nc + \L < nc — 1. In this
case, the marginal rate of transformation in consumption for agents A is larger than 1,
as any unit of consumption in period 1 can be converted into 5/4 units of consumption
in period 2. It is easy to show that in this case agents A maximize utility by lending
L = L2, where L2 = \0l, and k = 1 -f | ' ~ . Note that k G [1,2], and k — 1 when <f> = 0,
i.e. when utility is linear. Hence, L2 > L\. When the country is a net lender, ceteris
paribus agents A are better off if agents C leave in period 2, as they share L in period
2 with agents B only. Therefore, if 6nc + \L2 < nc — 1, i.e. for nc G ( ( 1Jgr ,3], — L2
dominates any other X < 017.
(in) Now assume that nc is such that One + L\ > nc — 1, i.e. nc € (yr£? (I-IU*
Because now One ~f~ iL2 > nc — 1, at X — —L2 a mass fi\ > 0 of agents C stay such
that One + A/5+H\ ~ n° ~ *' ^e^ ^ 3 ^ e ^ e v a^ u e °f ^ ^na^ makes agents C indifferent
between staying and moving when no agents C are present: One + f^3 = nc — 1> i.e.
L3 = | (nc(0 — 1) — 1). For any L E [L3, f £3], period 2's consumption of agents A is
constant at
 4y5^ .M = nc(l — 0) — 1. Hence, in this interval of values of L, any increase
in L reduces period 1 consumption, but does not increase period 2 consumption, as
it only attracts more agents C from abroad. It is then clear that L3 dominates any
L 6 [L3, |Ir3]. Thus, either L*A = Lx or L\ = L3. When nc = YZ?» £3 = 0 and Lx
clearly dominates. At the other extreme of the interval considered here, nc = Wzfr>
L3 = \L\ and L3 clearly dominates. Thus, there exists an nc such that L\ = L\ for
n
c € [jze,nc) and £^ = L3 for n a G [n4c, ^ i | | ] .
17Note that, for very low values of 0, (1 + | f - ) / ( l — 9) could be larger than 3, in which case the
interval considered here would be empty.
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(iv) Finally, consider values of nc such that 6nc+L\ < nc—d and 9nc+\L2 > nc~ 1,
i.e. nc G (jfiff? M-VS ]• Now neither Li nor L2 can be optimal, and it is easy to see




This appendix illustrates the nature of some problems that can arise for intermediate
levels of income. Consider an economy with 0 less than, but close to, 1, and with UB < 1-
Therefore, if all agents C stay, the tax rate in period 2 is 1. Now suppose in period 1
the country lends the amount X — —L, which is such that, at r2 = 1, agents C certainly
leave. In other words, even if all agents C leave, an agent C who stays would be able to
consume
0 + -L<nc-l (D.I)
However, L is such that, if the tax rate where 0 and the marginal agent C were able
to retain all his labor income, One + \L > YIQ — 1. It is easy to see that all agents C
staying or all agents C leaving are not Nash equilibria. Now let //i be the mass of agents
C staying such that at r2 = 0 agents C are indifferent beteen staying and leaving:
0nc + 4 = nc - 1 (D.2)
Also, define \ii as the mass of agents C staying such that the average income of the
econmy is equal to UQ: H2nc + \nB — nB- It is clear that in any Nash equilibrium the
mass of agents C staying must be no greater than //2. Otherwise, the income of the
median voter would be below the average and r2 = 1. But at this tax rate, from (D.I)
all agents C would leave. Given r2 = 0, a Nash equilibrium with a positive mass of
agents C staying can occur only if this mass is exactly ^ i , so that the marginal agent is
indifferent between staying and leaving. Thus, a Nash equilibrium requires [ii < fj,2, so
that at fa r2 is indeed 0. However, at high values of 0 and L, \i\ > /x2, and it is easy to
see that neither ^ i , nor ^2, nor any other mass of agents C staying is a Nash equilibrium.
The problem, of course, is the discontinuity in agents C's income that occurs when the
mass of agents C staying is fi2. Furthermore, it is easy to see that in this setup there
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is no Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies, either. Notice that, when 9 < 1/2, \i\ < fi2
and therefore fii was a Nash equilibrium.18
There are several possibilities to address the problem of the non-existence of a Nash
equilibrium for certain levels of L when 0 6 (1/2,4). Suppose the economy is composed
of a large, but finite, number of agents. One could assume that, before taxes are voted on
in period 2, agents C have to decide, sequentially, whether they want to stay or not. The
order is decided randomly, and agents C cannot reconsider their decision. Abstracting
from integer problems, it is easy to see that initially, all agents C will decide to stay,
until a proportion ^ of them has been asked to commit to moving or staying. After
this, all other agents C will decide to leave. An alternative, although less satisfactory,
solution does not require assuming a finite number of agents. In the problem described
above, the cooperative solution for agents C is such that exactly a mass fj,2 of agents
stay. With some form of cooperation among agents C, \x<2 is therefore the equilibrium.
Appendix E.
This appendix shows that, when 0 increases, UQ increases while UQ falls. Recall that n^
is defined implicitly by
H = {One + Dts)1'* + (»c - l ) w - 2{0nc)l-+ = 0 (E.I)
Let M = 0nc + ^ M , N = nc — 1 and Q = 0nc. Also, let Kz indicate ^77^, with
K — M, JV, Q and z = 0,nc. Then one can write, ignoring multiplicative constants:
uu
where QQ = 1. Using (E.I), (E.2) can be rewritten as
H = 2Ql-\Me - Qe) - MeN1'9 (E.3)
The r.h.s. of (E.3) is negative for <j> < 1, since Q/N < 3/2, while M0/(M9 - Qe) > 3.
Using a similar method, one can write
dH
dn. - Nnc) (E.4)
18To show that pi < /i2, from (D.2) notice that fi\ is maximum at X — Xmax = 9 and 6 = 0max = 1/2,
while /i2 is independent of both X and 9. Let fimax be this maximum value of fi\. It is easy to see thatfimax = 112 at nc = 3; moreover, both fimax and ^2 are decreasing functions of nc, but the former falls
faster as nc increases. Therefore, nmax < t*2-
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which is positive. Hence, d^ = - f f / | f^ > 0.
Now consider how UQ is affected by changes in 0. n2c is defined by
r s (# + DL,)1-* - 2 ( 0 =0 (E.5)
Using a procedure similar to that followed above, one can easily show that | ^ > 0 and
•^ > 0, and therefore ^ < 0.
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